This study explores how status and reputation develop, helps differentiate the two assets, and provides insight into how new firms build these important intangible assets. Using a sample of more than 500 newly-founded VC firms, we find that reputation and status positively influence each other, but that reputation has a greater effect on status, particularly when firms are younger. We also find that the effect of past status on current status weakens as VC firms age, but the relationship between past and current reputation remains consistent with age. Furthermore, our findings show that participating in blockbuster deals has a positive relationship with status when firms are young and a positive relationship with reputation when firms are older, and helps low status and low reputation firms more than it helps high status and high reputation firms.
Introduction
Philosophers, scientists and theologians have long grappled with the causality dilemma, "Which came first? The chicken, or the egg?" In management research, one illustration of this conundrum is the struggle to distinguish two valuable intangible assets -organizational reputation and status (e.g., Barron & Rolfe, 2012; Washington & Zajac, 2005) .
Recent research has begun to parse out the differences between these two constructs and explore the roles they play in the social construction of markets (e.g., Dimov, Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2007; Lee, Pollock & Jin, 2011; Washington & Zajac, 2005) . Washington and Zajac (2005: 283) summarized the key theoretical differences between reputation and status when they stated, "status is fundamentally a sociological concept that captures differences in social rank that generate privilege or discrimination (not performance-based awards), while reputation is fundamentally an economic concept that captures differences in perceived or actual quality or merit that generate earned, performance-based rewards. " While researchers have speculated about which construct drives the other (e.g., Podolny, 2005; Sorensen, 2007) , and considered how the reputation of a firm's initial partners influences its future status (Milanov & Shepherd, 2013) , little theoretical or empirical work explores how a firm's own reputation and status co-evolve over time and the factors that may influence their evolution.
The VC industry is an ideal setting to examine these issues. It is an industry in which reputation has both symbolic and substantive benefits for the firms they fund ; and it is an inherently collaborative, with extensive webs of inter-organizational relations constructed through investment syndicates that exert significant influence on the functioning and behavior of VC firms (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007; Milanov & Shepherd, 2013) . These extensive and visible networks highlight the importance of status within the industry and make it possible to study these relationships and how they evolve over time (Fund, et al., 2008) .
We contribute to the literatures on organizational reputation and status by developing theory that explores how reputation and status evolve. In addition, we start from a firm's founding and theorize how the relationship between reputation and status changes as a firm ages. We also theorize about how the relationship between past and current reputation and status changes over time, and explore how age and prior reputation and status condition the effects of firms' actions on their subsequent reputation and status. Finally, the insights we develop provide a more nuanced understanding of how new firms develop these valuable intangible assets.
Theory And Hypotheses

Reputation and Status
In a recent review of the organizational reputation literature, Lange and colleagues (2011) argued that reputation is multidimensional, consisting of a generalized awareness of the organization, the perceived predictability of a firm based on past performance (i.e., being known for reliability or quality), and generalized favorability that reflects the audience's overall judgment of the organization as good or attractive. Similarly, Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward (2006: 64) describe a firm's reputation as "the belief of various stakeholders regarding the likelihood that the firm will deliver value along key dimensions of performance" that can be used as a signal of future behavior and performance.
Organizational status is defined as observers' perceptions of the organization's relative standing within a social order (Podolny, 2005; Washington & Zajac, 2005) . Status is a socially constructed asset that can "generate privilege or discrimination" (Washington & Zajac, 2005: 283) and is used to signal quality when uncertainty is high (Podolny, 2005) . Its cachet is ascribed by observers based on their perception that the organization is favored by other high-status actors, which is deduced from observable patterns of affiliation and deference (Gould, 2002; Podolny, 2005) . Status can be achieved by attracting high-status actors as affiliates, partners and customers, or through processes such as bandwagon effects (Gould, 2002) . While these definitions are conceptually similar, they differ in fundamental ways. Status is based on observing an organization's affiliation with prestigious partners and its centrality in market networks (Podolny, 2001; Washington & Zajac, 2005) , and is thus more distantly related to the organization's ability to meet its stakeholders' expectations than reputation, which is directly derived from stakeholders' estimations of organizational attributes and their subsequent expectations of future behaviors (Lange et al., 2011) . A firm can also have different reputations with different stakeholder groups for different things (Lange et al., 2011) . However, differences in status reflect fundamental social characteristics or structures that can be unrelated to-and exist independently of-real or perceived quality differences (Washington & Zajac, 2005) . Reputation and status also differ in their influence on firms' strategic decisions. For example, Dimov, and colleagues (2007) found that VC reputation weakens the negative relationship between finance capacity and the decision to invest in early-stage ventures, while VC status strengthens the same relationship. Similarly, Lee and colleagues found that while both VC reputation and status enhance initial market responses to the IPO firms they invest in, only reputation is also related to post-IPO operating performance. Research, Vol. 34 [2014] 
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The Coevolution of Reputation and Status
Despite the widespread interest in organizational reputation and status, there has been limited research on how the two constructs co-evolve. Research has established that high reputation based on strong performance can increase access to elite social circles (Hallen, 2008; Milanov & Shepherd, 2013) , while high status can provide greater access to the information, opportunities and resources that can enhance reputation (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Sorensen, 2007) . Thus, the privileges of status can create opportunities to improve performance, and hence reputation, and reputations earned through merit can increase entry to more elite social circles, and hence status. Because both reputation and status provide benefits that aid in developing the other, we expect them to have a positive relationship as they co-evolve. As this expectation is unsurprising, we do not present a formal hypothesis; however, it does form our baseline assumption. In the following sections we develop hypotheses that place important conditions on this basic relationship.
The Effects of Firm Age
We do not expect the nature of this relationship to remain the same over time. During its early years a firm has little standing in its industry's social hierarchy; what status it possesses is largely the result of the founder's personal status (Fund et al., 2008; Hallen, 2008) . To enhance its status, the new firm needs to build relationships with high-status actors. This is particularly critical in the VC industry, where VCs routinely participate in investment syndicates and information about VCs and investment opportunities flow within these networks (Podolny, 2001) . Without a highstatus founder, gaining access to these networks requires building a track record of performance (Fund et al., 2008; Rindova, et al., 2007) . To the extent that new VCs can bring promising deals to high-status VCs -thereby building their reputations -they will be able to develop relationships that begin to enhance their own status (Fund et al., 2008; Milanov & Shepherd, 2013) .
However, once established, status orders tend to be "sticky, " or relatively stable and selfreinforcing (Gould, 2002; Merton, 1968) . Both high-and low-status actors behave in ways that reinforce the current status order -low-status actors defer to high-status actors, and high-status actors prefer to interact with others of similar status (Gould, 2002) . The "Matthew Effect" (Merton, 1968) -wherein high-status actors also attract more attention and are given more credit for a particular level of performance -further reinforces status.
In contrast, reputations are more prone to change, and must be constantly reinforced (Lange et al., 2011; Pfarrer, et al., 2010) . Pfarrer and colleagues argued that because reputations are based on merit, consistent behavior is a key aspect of establishing and maintaining a reputation. If behaviors or performance are inconsistent, or if performance declines, reputations will follow suit (Love & Kraatz, 2009) . Although the effect of poor performance on reputation may be delayed or gradual, particularly if the declines are small and occur over time (Rhee & Valdez, 2009 ), large drops or crises can lead to significant reputational declines in very short order (Coombs, 1998) .
Taken together, this suggests that although status provides benefits that enhance reputation, reputation needs to be developed before status can be changed and these benefits are accessed. Thus, we expect that during the early years, reputation will have a greater influence on status than status has on reputation. However, as a VC firm ages and its status increases as a function of its reputation, VC firms should be able to access the status benefits that make it easier to continue being successful, thereby enhancing their reputation (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Fund et al., 2008; Sorensen, 2007 
The Effects of Past Status and Reputation over Time
Just as firm age can affect the relationship between reputation and status, we expect it will also affect the relationship between a firm's prior and current reputation and status. Research has shown that initial conditions significantly influence subsequent status (Milanov & Shepherd, 2013) . Further, as we have discussed, status is more inertial and self-sustaining than reputation (Gould, 2002; Pfarrer et al., 2010) . This suggests that while prior status and reputation are likely to have a positive relationship with current status and reputation, the strength of that relationship may change over time as new firms age and their status becomes stabilized. Specifically, we expect that over time the effect of changes in prior status on current status will become weaker, while the relationship between changes in prior reputation and current reputation will remain roughly the same, since reputations need to be more continually reinforced.
H2: The positive relationship between changes in a VC firm's past status and its current status will become weaker as VC firms age, but the relationship between changes in a VC firm's past reputation and its current reputation will be unaffected by firm age
Visible and Salient Events
Another factor that can influence how status and reputation evolve is their participation in visible and salient events. Visible performance outcomes can increase an actor's "cognitive" centrality (Bunderson, 2003; Fund et al., 2008) -that is, the extent to which other actors within a group have an accurate understanding of an actor's expertise and abilities -which in turn enhances their "structural" centrality, or status, and ability to gain resources and opportunities that enhance their subsequent performance and reputation (Fund et al., 2008) .
In the VC firm context, one such event is participation in "blockbuster deals" -initial public offerings (IPOs) that experience high levels of "underpricing" (Pollock & Gulati, 2007) . Blockbuster deals are positively viewed because VCs do not liquidate their entire investment as part of the IPO; thus big jumps in stock price enhance the value of the VC's investment. This gives VC firms the opportunity to "grandstand", which can increase investors' desires to invest in the VC's future funds (Lee & Wahal, 2004) .
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However, as with the relationship between reputation and status, we also expect that the effects of the number of blockbuster deals on a VC firm's status and reputation will vary as it ages. A high level of general visibility is an important component of reputation (Lange et al., 2011; Rindova et al., 2005) . Rindova and colleagues (2005) argued that a firm's visibility and prominence determine the value a firm receives from its quality and performance -that is, the value of a firm's reputation is a function of the extent to which its merit is widely recognized. Since reputation must be continually reinforced (Pfarrer et al., 2010) we expect the effects of blockbuster deals on reputation will not diminish as a VC firm ages.
In contrast, an actor's status within a social order is known by other actors in the community (Podolny, 1993) . Thus, when firms are young and not well known (i.e., their cognitive centrality is low) we expect the visibility and buzz associated with participating in blockbuster deals will enhance their status (Fund et al., 2008) However, as a VC firm ages and its position in the status order stabilizes, the visibility and attention is less likely to affect their status (Gould, 2002) . Further, not all VC firms will benefit equally from investing in blockbuster deals. Blockbuster deals provide valuable signals only to the extent they provide new information (Pollock, Chen, Jackson & Hambrick, 2010) , and information disconfirming prior beliefs tends to be more salient than information confirming expectations (Anderson, 1981) . Thus, the lower the expectation that a VC will be involved in a blockbuster deal, the bigger the surprise and the greater the effect on reputation and status blockbuster deal participation is likely to be (Pfarrer et al., 2010) . While low-reputation and low-status VC firms are not expected to participate in blockbuster deals, high-reputation and high-status VCs are expected to possess the skills and resources that lead to participating in blockbuster deals more frequently (Hallen, 2008; Milanov & Shepherd, 2013; Sorensen, 2007) . As such, if participation in blockbuster deals merely meets expectations for highreputation/high-status VCs, it should have a smaller effect on the VC's subsequent reputation and status than the same number of blockbuster deals for low-status/low-reputation VCs. Our final sample consisted of 511 VCs for the status evolution models and 528 VCs for the reputation evolution models, yielding 3,218 and 3,456 VC-year observations for the status and reputation evolution models, respectively. T-tests revealed no significant differences in reputation and age between the initial and final samples.
H4
Jointly Determined Variables
Status. Research has established that centrality in syndication networks is a good proxy for VC status (Hallen, 2008; Hochberg, et al., 2007; Podolny, 2001 ). Using available data on all the VCs in the TBO database, not just our sample, we operationalized status based on Bonacich's (1987) beta centrality. For each VC firm (both the newly-founded VC firms and VC firms founded before 1990) we constructed one-year adjacency matrices. To smooth patterns of affiliation (Rowley, Greve, Rao, Baum, & Shipilov, 2005) , each annual adjacency matrix included co-investment networks based on five-year moving periods beginning with the VC firm's founding year. For VC firms less than five years old we used all available data.
Reputation. Our VC reputation measure is a modified version of the Lee, Pollock and Jin (2011) LPJ reputation index, available at www.timothypollock.com/vc_reputation. The LPJ reputation index is a multi-item, time varying index that reflects a VC firm's ability to raise investment capital and develop start-ups. Like the LPJ index, our index included five formative indicators of VC firm reputation: (1) average of the total dollar amount of funds under management, (2) average of the number of investment funds under management, (3) number of start-ups invested, (4) total dollar amount of funds invested in start-ups, and (5) number of companies taken public, all calculated for the prior five years. The LPJ index also included firm age, which we excluded because we used it as a moderator in our theory and analyses. The two versions of the index are correlated at .98, and our results were the same regardless of whether we used the original or our modified index. These indicators were standardized and aggregated using a five-year moving average, and converted to a 100 point scale so that the index was comparable across years. This final measure was standardized so that the relative effects of reputation and status could be compared when testing Hypothesis 2. The results were unchanged when unstandardized measures of reputation and status were used in the analysis.
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Independent Variables
Firm age. Consistent with prior research Milanov & Shepherd, 2013) , VC firm age was calculated as the focal year minus the year a VC firm raised its first fund.
Blockbuster deals. Blockbuster deals were those whose weighted underpricing was above the 75th percentile of IPO underpricing for all IPOs in the year before the current year. We used an IPO's underpricing to operationalize blockbuster deals, since this measure is a widely viewed indicator of the IPO's success (Pollock & Gulati, 2007) . We weighted the underpricing of each IPO in a given year by its IPO value to allow for any potential effects of size.
Control Variables
Structural holes. Prior research has suggested that the number of structural holes in a network can influence status and reputation (Burt, 2005) . Following the prior literature (Burt, 2005) , we operationalized structural holes as 1 minus network constraint.
IPO success ratio. To capture the rate at which investments are converted into IPOs, the IPO success ratio was operationalized as the accumulated number of companies taken public divided by the accumulated number of companies invested by a VC in the current year (Chang, 2004) .
Industry diversification.
VCs that invest in more industries can develop a greater range of ties to other VCs and may possess somewhat less industry-specific expertise and resources than VC firms that are more focused . We identified industry segments based on the Venture Economics Industry Classification codes of the firms the VCs funded and operationalized industry diversification using the standard entropy measure (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979) .
Early stage preference.
We constructed a continuous measure of "early-stage specialization" by dividing the number of first investments in "Startup/Seed" and "Early Stage" by the number of total investments. The greater the ratio, the more the VC prefers to invest in early stages. Year Dummies. Because a variety of factors that can influence status and reputation vary from year to year we include a set of dummy variables coded "1" for each observation year in our sample (1990 is the omitted year) and zero otherwise.
Model Specification
To model the co-evolutionary process of status and reputation we used Arellano-Bond (Arellano and Bond, 1991 ) models, employing the xtabond2 command in STATA 11. This model accommodates three important features of the co-evolutionary process: 1) The effects of prior values of the dependent variable; 2) Simultaneity in the determination of status and reputation; and 3) Unobserved firm heterogeneity.
These three features give rise to different kinds of endogeneity. The Arellano-Bond approach effectively controls for within-group unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., fixed effects) and multiple sources of endogeneity, such as those associated with inclusion of a lagged DV as an independent variable, by incorporating the generalized method of moments (GMM) (Arellano, 2003) . We used difference GMM rather than system GMM. While the system GMM generates more efficient estimates, it assumes stationarity, or a steady state (Arellano, 2003) , which is unlikely in our sample. To control for heteroscedasticity, we report robust standard errors.
To test hypotheses 1a and 1b we employed the Wald χ 2 -test to compare the coefficients for reputation and status predicting the other construct. To obtain the necessary covariance we used the stack command to combine the two non-nested datasets into a single "stacked" dataset in which each set of the two non-nested, but jointly determined observations. The parameter estimates generated by the stacked model were exactly the same as those we present in our table. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables in our sample. Analyses not shown here suggested that collinearity and autocorrelation were not issues, and that our instruments were valid as a group. Table 2 presents the results of our analyses testing H1a-b and H3a-b; due to space limitations we only include the relevant coefficients. Table 3 presents the analyses testing Hypotheses 2 and 4.
Results
Hypothesis 1a argued that reputation would have a greater effect on status than status would have on reputation when firms are young, while H1b argued that status would have a greater effect on reputation than reputation has on status when firms are older. To test these hypotheses we ran a series of regressions splitting the sample into sub-samples based on different age increments, presented in Table2. We began with firms less than and greater than five years of age, and increased the lower age break by two years in each regression.
Reputation has a positive and significant relationship with status in all models. However, status has a negative and moderately significant (p<.10) relationship with reputation for VC firms five years or younger. Although the relationship becomes positive for firms seven years old or less, it is not significant until VC firms are nine years old. According to the Wald χ 2 -tests, reputation has a stronger effect on status than status has on reputation in all models. Thus, H1a is supported and H1b is not supported.
H2 argued that firm age would weaken the relationship between prior and current status, but would not affect the relationship between prior and current reputation. The results in Models 3 and 4 of Table 3 support this hypothesis. The interaction between age and prior status is negative and significant (p<.001), but the interaction between prior reputation and age is not significant. Figure 1 graphs the relationship using values one standard deviation above and below the mean. As the figure shows, the effect of prior status on current status becomes weaker as firms age.
We conducted a power analysis to ensure that the non-significant interaction between age and prior reputation was not due to low statistical power. Because traditional power tests cannot be used with GMM, we conducted multiple Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the statistical power of our model (Davidson & MacKinnon, 2003 . The average power of our models was .93, suggesting our models possess sufficient power to detect even small effect sizes. Research, Vol. 34 [2014], Iss. 13, Art. 1 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson https://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol34/iss13/1 H3a-b argued that participating in blockbuster deals positively affects both reputation and status when VC firms are young but will only affect reputation when VC firms are older. The results in Table 2 show that 1) the number of blockbuster deals has a positive and significant relationship with status for VC firms seven years old and younger, 2) this relationship becomes non-significant when VC firms eight to eleven years old were included, and 3) this relationship is negative and significant for VC firms more than thirteen years old. The results for reputation show that the number of blockbuster deals has a positive but non-significant relationship with reputation for VC firms nine years old and younger, and the relationship remains positive and becomes significant for VC firms more than nine years old. Thus, H3a is supported for status but not reputation, and H3b is supported for reputation but not status.
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H4 argued that the relationship between blockbuster deals, status and reputation would be stronger for low-reputation and low-status VC firms than for higher-reputation and high-status firms. The interaction between blockbuster deals and prior reputation in Table 3 is negative and significant in models 6 (p<.001) and 8 (p<.05), providing support for H4 for reputation. The interaction between prior status and blockbuster deals is negative and significant (p<.01) in model 5, but is not statistically significant in model 8. Thus, H4 is partially supported for status.
Figures 2 and 3 graph the significant interactions from models 5 and 6 for values one standard deviation above and below the mean for past status and reputation and for one and three blockbuster deals. The figures show that participation in blockbuster deals appears to have a stronger effect on reputation than on status, as the slopes of the lines in the reputation graph are steeper than in the status graph. Further, participation in blockbuster deals appears to have a slightly negative relationship with subsequent status for high-status VCs.
Discussion
In this study we explore how status and reputation co-evolve, and examined the nuances of this relationship by considering the moderating influence of firm age and the effects of participating in significant, highly visible events. While status and reputation positively influence each other, their influence is not equivalent and changes over time. We also found that status and reputation are influenced in different ways by their prior levels as they age, and by participation in significant and visible events. These findings provide both theoretical and practical insights.
Our finding that reputation precedes status in their abilities to enhance each other, and appears to have a greater influence on status than status has on reputation, is theoretically important because it offers a basis for assessing which intangible asset has more value. It also provides insights into how young firms should allocate scarce resources and attention required for building these assets early in their lives, and why they may vary in their overall success if they focus on building the wrong intangible asset at the wrong stage of development. A practical implication of this finding is that while it is important to form relationships with high-status others (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999) , it is also-and perhaps more-critical to develop a record of performance that builds a solid reputation early in the firm's life (Rindova et al., 2007; Petkova, 2012) . Once a firm builds a good reputation, that reputation works to enhance status and the two will continue to evolve in a dynamic, mutually beneficial way.
Our results also suggest that while the relationship between prior and current status weakens as a firm becomes more mature, the relationship between prior and current reputation is unaffected by firm age. Thus, our results are consistent with prior research arguing that status is "stickier" than reputation (Gould, 2002; Merton, 1968; Washington & Zajac, 2005) , but offers a more complex understanding of how this stickiness occurs, at least for young firms.
Finally, our results suggest that involvement in blockbuster deals is more beneficial for enhancing status than reputation when VC firms are young, but is more beneficial for enhancing reputation than status when VC firms are older. One possible interpretation of these findings is that blockbuster deals have a greater effect on status because the associated attention and visibility they provide speeds up the process of enhancing a firm's cognitive centrality (Fund et al., 2008) among VCs, and thus its status. In contrast, since it takes time to establish a track record of performance, the visibility and attention of blockbuster deals have less influence on reputation until the necessary performance record is established.
Our results also show that participation in blockbuster deals yield greater benefits for lowstatus and low-reputation firms. Low-reputation firms enhance their reputations more quickly because their success is more surprising and has greater signaling value than for high-reputation firms. Our results also suggest that blockbuster deals help low-status firms build their status more rapidly. Prior research found that status can take a long time to build (Podolny, 2005; Washington & Zajac, 2005) . Thus, we contribute to the conversation by demonstrating that highly visible events can reduce the amount of time that it takes for a firm to enhance its status.
Our results also provide some evidence that participation in blockbuster deals can have a negative effect on status for older firms and high-status firms. Although the moderating effect of prior status was small, one interpretation of this finding is that when high-status VCs participate in more blockbuster deals they may feel less need to subsequently syndicate these deals with other high-status actors, who will demand greater equity participation in the deals and also want to have a larger say in how the start-ups are managed. Rather, they may begin to include more lowstatus VCs who will defer to the higher-status VC (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; Gould, 2002) . This interpretation is consistent with Fund and colleagues' (2008) observation that as new VC firms Benchmark Capital an August Capital became more central in industry deal networks they began to participate in syndicates with the most central VCs less frequently.
